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The Relationship between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value
It is sometimes held that “the aesthetic” and “the cognitive” are separate categories.1
Enterprises concerning the former and ones concerning the latter have different aims. They
require distinct modes of attention and reward divergent kinds of appreciation.
This position has its detractors.2 The typical line of objection is to argue that
cognitive values can bear upon aesthetic ones. Works of art and literature can disclose
important truths about the world; they can teach us in non-trivial ways. Moreover, their
doing so often contributes to their aesthetic merits.
I, too, reject the independence or autonomy of aesthetic and cognitive categories.
However, I seek to develop a radically different defense of this position, one that inverts the
traditional strategy. I aim to show that a work’s aesthetic merits can bear upon its cognitive
ones.3
To build my case, I will focus on a very specific set of works, namely philosophical
texts. The relationship between aesthetic value and cognitive value that I hope to establish is
most readily apparent here. I believe that what I will say can be generalized to other kinds of
texts, including works of literature, as well as to other kinds of artifacts, including paintings
and sculptures. However, I will not defend the generalization in this paper.
1.

Definitions

Some definitions are in order. First, I will take “aesthetic value” to refer to that which makes
an object worthy or unworthy of being perceived, contemplated, or otherwise appreciated
for its own sake.4 Accordingly, I will not consider it to encompass merely those aspects of an
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object productive of sensory pleasure or its opposite, such as beauty, gracefulness, elegance,
and their contraries. I will treat it as circumscribing a broader range of features including
what Noël Carroll calls expressive properties (somber, melancholic, gay, bold, stately,
pompous), Gestalt properties (unified, balanced, tightly knit, chaotic), taste properties
(gaudy, vulgar, kitschy, garish), and reaction properties (sublime, beautiful, comic,
suspenseful).5
I will exclude from the purview of my investigation aesthetic value properties that
are cognitive in nature, such as being profound, insightful, true, or misleading. Incorporating
them into the discussion would render my thesis trivial. Aesthetic values would obviously
bear on cognitive values because some of them would be cognitive values.6
Second, when I turn to cognitive values themselves, I will focus on a proper subset
of them, namely those we might call philosophical values. Doing otherwise would once again
diminish the interest of my thesis. The general category of cognitive value includes such
things as instructional, educational, or pedagogical value. There is nothing novel about
trumpeting the importance of aesthetic considerations in these arenas. Horace made the
point millennia ago.7 Texts that move us or that display eloquence and wit more often hit
home. We more frequently remember them, incorporate their conclusions into our web of
beliefs, and integrate their ideas into our deliberations. To take but one example, the beauty
of Descartes’s writing repeatedly draws us back to his Meditations. Time and again it leads us
to consider claims made in this work that we otherwise might have forgotten long ago.
What, then, is philosophical value such that attention to it possesses greater interest?
We can begin by noting that philosophical texts aim inter alia at truth.8 Accordingly, part of
their value qua philosophical texts—i.e. part of their philosophical value—consists in
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whether they achieve this goal. Another sizable portion concerns how well they support the
truths they proclaim. Indeed, the strength of a text’s arguments is likely the most decisive
measure of its philosophical merit. Of course, other considerations deserve mention as well,
such as the internal consistency of the text and its contribution to topics of perennial interest
to the philosophical community. Although not exhaustive, this list is sufficiently informative
for our purposes.9
The foregoing account of philosophical value might appear to undercut my position.
We might wonder how it could matter to our philosophical assessment of a work whether it
exhibited great literary eloquence, profoundly moved us on an emotional level, or contained
that high level of implicit meaning known as “semantic density.” Indeed, of what philosophical
importance could it be whether the prose of a text was lifeless, serene, dynamic, vulgar, or
vivid? Such considerations look irrelevant to the strength of a work’s arguments, its internal
consistency, or the truth of its conclusions. Claiming otherwise seems to involve a category
mistake.
Nevertheless, I will defend the counterintuitive line. I will argue that the aesthetic
value of a text can bear upon the philosophical value of a text. That is not to say that it
always does so, or that it is ever the sole determining factor, only that it sometimes does so
and to some degree.
2.

Clarifications

In principle, aesthetic value could bear upon cognitive value in two ways. First, some
aesthetic values might metaphysically constitute cognitive values. Possession of them could be
commendatory or pejorative in a cognitive sense. Berys Gaut cites profundity and
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insightfulness as potential examples.10 Second, the presence of some aesthetic values might
help epistemically ground judgments about cognitive value. The fact that a work has them could
figure into the reasons for giving a positive or negative assessment of the work’s cognitive
merit.
I shall proceed along the latter front. I will argue that aesthetic values can bear upon
cognitive values by epistemically grounding claims about their presence or absence in a
particular work.
Aesthetic values supervene on aesthetic properties.11 Such supervenience takes two
forms.12 First, some aesthetic properties are themselves evaluative. They are bearers of
aesthetic value or that in which aesthetic value resides. To say an object has one of these
properties is in part to say the object is to some degree aesthetically good or bad.13 For
example, to describe a work as sublime, moving, or bold is normally to appraise it positively.
To call it dreary, derivative, or boring is typically to assess it negatively.14
Second, some aesthetic properties are not evaluative but are nonetheless relevant to
aesthetic value. They figure into our explanations of why an object warrants a particular
aesthetic value judgment.15 For instance, to describe the pace of a novel as fast is not usually
to evaluate it. Yet, we might point to the fact that a novel is fast-paced to account for why
we call it gripping, which would be an evaluative comment.
I will focus on aesthetic properties that are themselves evaluative. I do not merely
wish to show that a work’s aesthetic properties bear upon its philosophical value but that its
aesthetic value does so.16
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3.

False Starts

The following observation provides a tempting point of departure. When assessing
philosophical texts, we often raise considerations that fall into a category that overlaps with
aesthetics, namely stylistics. We praise or disparage works because they possess or lack
properties such as clarity, succinctness, awkwardness, and eloquence. We include “wellwritten,” or its opposite, in referee reports and in comments on student papers. The
existence of such vocabulary in our critical practices suggests stylistic considerations (and so
perhaps aesthetic ones) may affect philosophical value. After all, some scholars cite the
appearance of cognitive vocabulary in art criticism as evidence that cognitive values
influence aesthetic ones.17 Why should not something of the reverse hold as well?
We must tread carefully here. The fact that an evaluative judgment concerns a
philosophical work does not thereby make it a judgment about the philosophical value of
that work. The reasons for the judgment matter.18 For example, if I extol William Irwin’s The
Simpsons and Philosophy because it made a large sum of money, or if I laud Plato’s Republic
because it helped shape the western world, my evaluations are not philosophical in nature. In
neither case am I concerned with the truth of the work’s content, the strength of its
arguments, its internal consistency, etc. The same point might hold for assessments based on
stylistic considerations. Although frequently made of philosophical works, they might reveal
nothing about these works’ philosophical value. At least, we would need additional reasons
before ruling out this possibility. Thus, we cannot conclude from the mere existence of
stylistic vocabulary in criticisms of philosophical writing that stylistic value (and so perhaps
aesthetic value) bears upon philosophical value.
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A second observation might afford better initial footing. We might defend the idea
that aesthetic value can influence philosophical value by noting that we esteem some
philosophical texts as highly as we do precisely because of their aesthetic merits. For
instance, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”
probably would not occupy such lofty places in the canon were it not for their incomparable
wit. Augustine’s Confessions likely would attract fewer readers were it less moving. Finally,
Austin’s “Truth” might have received less attention had it not contained so many quotable
passages.19
Conceding the accuracy of these conjectures, what follows? Not much. They indicate
the philosophical community cares about more than just philosophical matters. They also
suggest some texts have aesthetic and philosophical value. However, neither point in itself
entails that aesthetic value affects philosophical value.
4.

Implications of Aesthetic Properties

How, then, to proceed? Perhaps the best way is with the notion that a text’s aesthetic
properties can implicitly express statements and claims. This idea is not new, having been
suggested by Martha Nussbaum,20 Peter Kivy,21 and others.22 However, it lacks a robust
defense. I will provide one here.
First, note that works of literature typically prompt us to adopt the point of view of
the (presumed) narrator. When reading Camus’s The Stranger, we find ourselves looking at the
world through the eyes of Mersault. The pages of Dickens’s Copperfield draw us into the title
character’s perspective on life. Finally, the power of Nabokov’s Lolita lies in its ability to
make us empathize with Humbert Humbert.
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Something different happens when reading philosophical texts. We do not
automatically enter into the (presumed) author’s world. We do not extend him or her the
same leeway regarding the facts. Instead, we interrogate each word and sentence. We
demand justifications for every assertion.
The difference in our reactions is partly due to genre expectations. But style, structure,
and tone also play a role. Take Spinoza’s Ethics. It proceeds in an abstract, impersonal, and
dispassionate manner. These features keep us at arm’s length from Spinoza, the man. They
force us to concentrate on the ideas he puts forth. Moreover, the text’s geometric feel
encourages us to submit it to the same cold, logical analysis we would a mathematical
proof.23 Alternatively, consider the dialogues of Plato, Berkeley, and Hume. The characters
in them challenge and question each other’s views. We find ourselves caught up in the
process. Transformed into judges of an imaginary debate, we scrutinize the merits of each
new argument we encounter.
These examples show how the formal properties of a philosophical text can influence
our approach to its content. A work’s aesthetic properties can perform a similar function.24
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals illustrates the point. The Genealogy is a moving, provocative,
and even disturbing book. Conspicuous in this regard is the passage describing the journey
of Mr. Rash and Curious into the workshop where Judeo-Christian ideals are made.25 The
scene comes across as something out of a horror movie. The workshop is dark and
foreboding. Soft muttering and whispering emanate from hidden nooks and crannies.
Noxious air overcomes Mr. Rash and Curious; he struggles to contain his stomach. His
unease and disgust are contagious; they wash over us. The feelings we thereby acquire shape
how we perceive the workshop’s secrets.26 They glue our attention to the unnerving aspects
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of Mr. Rash and Curious’s discoveries. Thus, when he reports that Judeo-Christian values are
the product of lies and deception, his message strikes a chord:
—“They are miserable, no doubt of it, all these mutterers and nook counterfeiters,
although they crouch warmly together—but they tell me their misery is a sign of being chosen by God; one beats the dogs one likes the best; perhaps this misery is also
a preparation, a testing, a schooling, perhaps it is even more—something that will
one day be made good and recompensed with interested, with huge payments of
gold, no! of happiness. This they call ‘bliss.’”
—Go on!
—“Now they give me to understand that they are not merely better than the mighty,
the lords of the earth whose spittle they have to lick (not from fear, not at all from
fear! but because God has commanded them to obey the authorities)—that they are
not merely better but are also ‘better off,’ or at least will be better off someday. But
enough! enough! I can’t take any more. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop where ideals
are manufactured—it seems to me it stinks of so many lies.”27
The fact that a text’s aesthetic properties can influence us in this way underwrites their
ability to imply claims. The reasoning here falls roughly within the domain of pragmatics.
When engaging with others, we assume they will act cooperatively.28 In part this means we
expect them to encourage or direct us only in appropriate ways. We presume they will urge
us to do only what they believe suits the circumstances. Thus, when an interlocutor prompts
us to pursue a specific course of action, we take it that he or she believes the course of
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action is appropriate.29 In other words, the conventional implication of a person’s directive is
that he or she believes what he or she pushes us to do is somehow fitting.
5.

Analogies

That directives give rise to implications is most obvious when the directives take explicit
verbal form. Everyday conversation bears this out. Suppose that while working on a
construction site, I shout to my coworker, “Pass me your hammer.” The implications of my
command include that I want my coworker’s hammer and think it appropriate for her to
hand it to me. Or suppose that while sitting in a pub with an empty beer mug in my hand, I
call to the bartender, “Bring me another.” My order implies that I desire an additional beer
and find it fitting for the bartender to pour me one.
However, there is no need to limit the discussion to the spoken or written word.
Consider that non-verbal gestures can also function as directives.30 Pointing to my
coworker’s hammer while we work next to each other on a noisy construction site conveys
roughly the same message as shouting at her to hand it over. Suggestively shaking an empty
beer mug in the bartender’s sight line is more or less equivalent to verbally requesting one
more. These directive gestures generate the same implications as their spoken counterparts.
Pointing to the hammer in my coworker’s hand implies that I want it and believe she should
pass it to me. Suggestively shaking an empty mug at the bartender implies not only that I
want another beer but that I find it fitting for the bartender to provide it for me.
I believe that the aesthetic properties of some texts are analogous to such non-verbal
gestures. They too function as directives: They prompt readers to approach the semantic
content of the text in a particular way. And they get readers to view the text’s subject matter
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with a certain attitude or to see it from a certain perspective. Consequently, they too
engender implications.
Returning to the Genealogy brings out the point. Nietzsche drives us to engage this
text in a heightened emotional state by writing in a shrill and strident manner. It follows that
Nietzsche wants our emotions to be aroused when we read the Genealogy and that he believes
such arousal is integral to accomplishing the books’ goals. Indeed, were Nietzsche not of this
mindset, we would have trouble understanding why he wrote in the manner he did.
6.

Implicatures, Presuppositions, and Entailments

Implications of the kind I have been discussing arise partly because of a pragmatic
consideration. We must believe the implications in order to make sense of what the speaker
or author is saying or doing. We must assume their truth in order to interpret the person
issuing the directive as engaged in cooperative and rational behavior.
In this section, I will develop a more formal account of such implications, one that
will enable us to calculate precisely what implications will be generated by a given sentence,
speech act, gesture, or aesthetic property. To do so, I will compare them with three related
phenomena: (1) Gricean implicatures, (2) presuppositions, and (3) entailments.
6.1. Implicatures
Conversational implicatures refer to the act of meaning one thing by saying or writing
another. For example, in the right context, one implicates a request to open the window by
uttering, “It is hot in here.” By asserting, “Jones ate some of the cookies,” a person implicates
the additional proposition that Jones did not eat all the cookies. Finally, by touting Smith’s
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penmanship in a letter of recommendation for employment as a philosophy professor, one
implicates that Smith is under-qualified.
Grice maintains that conversational implicatures arise in part because we must
suppose their truth to understand the speaker or author as behaving cooperatively.31 Thus
they bear some similarity to the phenomenon I have in mind. However, Grice also describes
implicatures as having the peculiar feature of being cancellable.32 It is possible to revoke or
overturn them without rendering the original statement incoherent. For instance, as noted,
“John ate some of the cookies” implicates that John did not eat all of them. But no
confusion arises if this implicature is repudiated. It would be perfectly acceptable to say,
“John ate some of the cookies; in fact, he ate all of them.”
Implications of the sort I have been describing lack this property. Their cancellation
leads to absurdity. It would be incongruous for someone to instruct a coworker, “Pass me
your hammer,” and follow this up by adding, “But it would be inappropriate for you to do
so.” The same point holds in situations where the directive takes the form of a gesture rather
than an utterance. Suggestively waving a now empty beer mug in front of the bartender
while saying “I don’t want any more” would make little sense.
Of course, it is possible to tell someone to pass the hammer while believing he or
she should not do so. It is also possible to order another beer despite not wanting one. But
such speech acts are defective. It is not in keeping with the expectation of cooperative
behavior to direct people to do something without believing they should do it or without
wanting the outcome to obtain.
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6.2. Presuppositions
Presuppositions might seem a better fit than implicatures. Roughly speaking, presuppositions
are propositions a speaker or author seems to take for granted in uttering or writing a
sentence.33 They are “taken for granted” in the sense that they are not part of the content of
the original statement but their truth is a precondition of the statement’s felicity. In other
words, if the speaker or author did not assume the truth of these propositions, what he or
she said or wrote would somehow be inappropriate. To use two shopworn examples, saying
“The present king of France is bald” presupposes the proposition, “There is a present king
of France.” And asking “Have you stopped beating your wife?” presupposes you have a wife
and have been beating her.
One defining trait of presuppositions is their ability to project from embeddings.34
Unlike conversational implicatures, they typically arise even when the statement triggering
them is nested within an operator such as negation. For instance, “It is not the case that the
present king of France is bald” also presupposes France currently has a king. So too do the
following sentences: “If the present king of France is bald, I’ll eat my hat”; “The president
thinks the present king of France is bald”; and, “Did you know that the present king of
France is bald?”
The ability to project from embeddings distinguishes presuppositions from the
phenomenon to which I have been attending. If I tell you to pass me the hammer, I do take
for granted that I want the hammer and that I find it fitting for you to give it to me. My
directive would be infelicitous (because insincere or not genuine) were these things not true.
But the propositions “I want the hammer” and “I believe it is appropriate for you to pass me
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the hammer” are not presupposed if the original directive is embedded in an operator such
as negation. They are not implied by someone who declares, “Do not pass me the hammer.”
Nor are they assumed by a person who says any of the following: “The foreman thinks you
should pass me the hammer”; “If you pass me the hammer, I will not know what to do with
it”; or, “Do you think it is wise to pass me the hammer?”35
6.3. Entailments
Failure of both projection and cancellation brings the phenomena I have in mind closest to a
third kind of implication, namely entailment. However, they are not entailments of a logical
sort. Logical entailments relate in a truth-functional fashion to their trigger statements. To
wit, p logically entails q if and only if q is true whenever p is true. This formula does not fit
the implications I have been discussing. The triggers in my examples are directives, and
directives lack truth conditions. Commands such as “Pass me the hammer” and requests
such as “Bring me another beer” are not the sort of statements that can be true or false. The
same point holds a fortiori for aesthetic properties that serve directive functions. It is a
category mistake to claim that being shocking or moving, for instance, is true or false.
Returning to the domain of pragmatics allows us to accommodate this point. Instead
of talking about truth conditions, we can talk about felicity conditions—i.e. the conditions
under which an act is performed successfully and non-defectively.36 Commands, requests,
instructions, and the like do possess these. For example, we say that a person gives advice in
a successful and non-defective fashion only if he or she thinks the advised course of action
will help the advisee.37
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We can use felicity conditions to construct an account of pragmatic entailments. Loosely
speaking, the idea is that statements, gestures, etc. pragmatically entail their felicity
conditions.38 More formally, p pragmatically entails q if and only if q is true whenever p is
felicitous.39 For example, Professor Brown’s believing that taking Introduction to Philosophy
is beneficial for Sam is a felicity condition on Brown’s advising Sam to enroll in the course.
Brown’s advice would be defective (because insincere) if she did not hold this belief.
Therefore, the pragmatic entailment of Brown’s advice is that she believes Sam will benefit
from a semester of philosophy.
It bears repeating that we need not limit ourselves to linguistic utterances here.
Directives spawn pragmatic entailments regardless of the form they take. Suggestively
shaking my now empty beer mug at the bartender pragmatically entails “I want a beer” and
“I find it fitting for the bartender to bring me one” in exactly the same way as uttering the
command, “Pour me another.” Similarly, Nietzsche’s writing in a shrill and strident style
pragmatically entails that he wants his reader’s emotions aroused and believes they should be
aroused just as much as if he had opened the Genealogy with the explicit instruction, “Engage
this text on an emotional level.”
7.

The Question of Scope

Just how often do a philosophical text’s aesthetic properties imply claims? As the forgoing
account indicates, the answer depends on how often they function as directives. I believe
they do so more often than it seems. In fact, they almost always do so in the sense that they
almost always prompt us to view the text’s subject matter with a certain attitude or in a
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certain light. I defended this line of argument earlier with respect to texts that have
conspicuous aesthetic features, such as Nietzsche’s Genealogy. I will now extend it farther.
Consider some of the least likely cases, philosophical journal articles in the analytic
tradition. We seldom read these texts with an eye toward their aesthetic properties. We rarely
dwell on their aesthetic merits. Thus it is tempting to believe they do not have any of either,
or at least not any of note. But it is possible to consider such works from an aesthetic point
of view. We can set aside our interest in their philosophical merits in order to submit them
to aesthetic analysis. When we do, we discover there is much to say.
In terms of their tone, philosophical journal articles are typically serious and stately
rather than offensive, jubilant, or melancholic. Their diction tends to be formal rather than
vulgar and profane. It is also usually precise and literal rather than vague, suggestive, or
metaphorical. Analytic journal articles tend to be tightly knit and systematic in their
organization rather than chaotic, diffuse, and fragmentary. Finally, their authorial voice is
almost always distant and impersonal. Only in exceptional cases is it passionate or intimate.
Although we may not realize it, all of these properties affect us. They lead us to
consider the content of the underlying work from a particular perspective or to adopt a
specific attitude toward it. The dignified and stately tone of philosophy journal articles
prompts us to take their theses seriously instead of treating them as fodder for amusement.
Their exact and technical language engages the analytic parts of our minds. It gets us to think
about the subject in question carefully and logically. Finally, the impersonal voice employed
by their authors subtly encourages us to set aside our personal concerns and reflect on the
claims being made in an unbiased fashion.
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Because the aesthetic properties of philosophical texts in the analytic tradition have
these effects on us, because they direct us in these ways, they imply claims: We ought to
approach them seriously and objectively. We should engage their content with the rational
parts of our minds. And we should trace the flow of their ideas closely and carefully.
As argued in previous sections, what generates these implications is a pragmatic
consideration. We must suppose the authors of analytic philosophy journal articles assume
or believe that a serious-minded and logical approach to their work is appropriate in order to
make sense of the aesthetic properties they give their works. More precisely, we need this
supposition to explain how their use of a dignified tone, precise diction, a systematic
structure, and an impersonal voice constitutes rational and cooperative behavior. We would
be flummoxed by someone who penned an article in such a style but hoped to evoke a
deeply emotional response or a flippant reaction. We would be inclined to think that the
person was incompetent or obtuse, not rational and cooperative.
8.

Aesthetic Properties and Philosophical Value

An argument is now in the offing for my general thesis that a text’s aesthetic properties can
affect its philosophical value. As we have seen, a text’s aesthetic properties can imply
statements or claims. But these claims need not align with those that comprise the text’s
explicit semantic content. The former can say one thing, the latter something else. These two
sets of claims can contradict each other.40 Such a contradiction is a philosophical defect; it
compromises the consistency of the text as a whole. In this way, possessing the wrong
aesthetic properties can detract from a text’s philosophical value. By the same token,
possessing the right aesthetic properties can support the philosophical value of a text. If the

17

implications of a text’s aesthetic properties coincide with its explicit content, the consistency
of the text is upheld.
A thought experiment illustrates the point. Imagine an alternative version of
Nietzsche’s Genealogy. Suppose it contains all the explicit content of the original work. It
includes the idea from the First Essay that the values of meekness and humility were initially
promoted by oppressed peoples as a subtle way to attack their rich and powerful masters. It
makes the claim found in the Second Essay that guilt is the result of a pent up drive for
cruelty. But, most importantly for our purposes, it contains the thesis located in the middle
of the Third Essay about acquiring moral knowledge: In order to fully appreciate moral
truths, such as those forwarded in the Genealogy, 41 we must engage them emotionally. If we
approach them in a wholly dispassionate manner, our understanding of them will be
impoverished.42
Now suppose also that our imaginary text differs from Nietzsche’s actual one in
terms of its aesthetic properties. It is not written in a shrill and strident style. It is neither
moving, nor shocking, nor unsettling. Rather, it proceeds in a dispassionate manner
reminiscent of Spinoza’s Ethics. It only addresses its readers’ intellects. It only arouses those
aspects of their minds devoted to abstract reasoning. In sum, it rephrases in an emotionally
neutral fashion all of the claims and arguments contained in the Genealogy.
The imaginary work suffers from the following problem. On the one hand, the fact
that it proceeds in a dispassionate fashion implies that a dispassionate approach to its
content is fitting. We need not engage our emotions to grasp the truths—including the
moral truths—it defends. On the other hand, the imaginary work explicitly states that a
dispassionate approach to moral truths is inappropriate. Acquisition of moral knowledge
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requires activation of the emotions. Thus, the work is internally inconsistent. One of the
claims implied by its aesthetic properties contradict one of the claims that comprise its
explicit semantic content.
The reason for this contradiction deserves emphasis. It arises because of the
aesthetic makeup of the imaginary text. More specifically, it stems from the fact that the
imaginary text lacks the very aesthetic properties that makes Nietzsche’s text aesthetically
valuable, namely its ability to move, shock and unsettle.43 If the imaginary text had these
aesthetic properties, it would be internally consistent.
To summarize, the decrease in aesthetic value that occurs when moving from the real
text to the imaginary one results in a decrease in philosophical value. In particular, the value
of internal consistency or coherence is lost. Conversely, the increase in aesthetic value that
occurs when moving in the opposite direction results in an increase in philosophical value.44
To wit, the value of consistency is gained.
9.

Aesthetic Value and Philosophical Value

We can now draw some conclusions about the relationship between aesthetic value and
philosophical value. I have shown that a text’s aesthetic value properties can imply
philosophical claims. These implicit claims can stand in various logical relationships with the
text’s explicit content. They can entail the truth or falsehood of any part of it. Consequently,
their presence can uphold or undermine the consistency of the text. In both scenarios, the
text’s aesthetic value affects its philosophical value.
Three cautionary notes are in order. First, the claims implied by a text’s aesthetic
properties can also be logically irrelevant to its semantic content. It is possible for them to
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entail neither the truth nor the falsehood of anything the text explicitly says. In such cases,
the text’s aesthetic properties might have no bearing on its philosophical value.
Second, the properties that positively affect a text’s philosophical value need not be
aesthetically meritorious. Just as there is bad art and bad literature, so too are there negative
aesthetic value properties. Moreover, if properties with a positive valence can contribute to
philosophical value, as in the case of Nietzsche’s Genealogy, so too can those with a negative
valence. There may be cases where the literary equivalent of Socrates’s ugly visage
contributes to the coherence of the text.45 Consequently, even when aesthetic value does
bear upon philosophical value, the correlation will not necessarily be direct.
Third, aesthetic value has only limited impact on philosophical value. The latter
consists in a plurality of things, from the truth of the claims made by a text, to the degree of
support it provides for these claims, to the influence of its arguments on perennial
philosophical problems, to its overall consistency, etc. Aesthetic properties do not bear on all
of these considerations. And for those it does affect, it is not the only relevant factor.
Consistency, for example, is not simply a matter of the relationship between the claims
implied by a text’s aesthetic properties and those that comprise its explicit semantic content.
Even accounting for these three caveats, the following conclusion holds. In some
cases, the possession of aesthetic value augments a text’s philosophical value. Conversely,
the lack of aesthetic merit sometimes engenders philosophical defects. Therefore, we ought
to attend to aesthetic considerations when creating and evaluating philosophical works. The
intuitive view that aesthetic value has nothing to do with philosophical value is mistaken.
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